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The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in 
Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an 
attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to 
modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the 
current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The 
attention was paid to the problem of various characte istics of legal principles. 
In further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about 
adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical 
discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper. 
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1. Introductory Remarks  
 
Józef Zajkowski wrote in 1936 that the modern science would not be able to sum up everything that 
have been developed directly or indirectly under th impact of Leon Petrażycki’s views. Lawyers 
are not always even aware of this what they owe to Petrażycki [26, p. 4]. The purpose of this 
presentation is to illustrate the thesis stated here [9]. I will do it following the issues addressed in 
the law regulations.  
I’m going to present the latest condition of theoretical and legal knowledge in the first part.  
I will pay attention to the issue of various features of legal rules. I will attempt to answer the 
following question: Which constructions offered by Petrażycki are present in the contemporary 
theoretical and legal discourse during my presentation. Authors, who undertake the issue of legal 
principles are often unaware of it. General conclusions will constitute the summary of the 
presentation.         
The assumptions developed by Petrażycki’s psychological theory of law, whose legal order 
is characterised by the categories of the mental experiences, are known and there is no need to refer 
to them here in this presentation [16], [17], [11]. In the paper entitled About law principles in the 
theory of Leon Petrażycki, which was published in Russian in the volume prepard by the Warsaw 
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University and Justice Academy in Krasnodar, I undertook the issue of characterising the law 
principles in Petrażycki’s theory [21]. This paper continues the previously completed deliberations.     
To start with the conclusions which ended the previously performed research. it has been 
established that the term of “law principles” belongs to Petrażycki’s terminology. However, the 
author uses this term rarely, often during the other issues discussed. It then difficult to establish the 
way he defines the term. Petrażycki pays attention consequently to dangers waiting for the lawyers 
who use professional legal terminology (which “legal principle” belongs to). At that point, there is 
no doubt that to analyse “legal principles” as theoretical category in Petrażycki’s perspective, 
similarly to the other cases we “get” – following Zajkowski’s words – into “the notional maze.” We 
can get lost in this maze and we can also overcome it. I will attempt to overcome it during my 
presentation.           
 
2. Legal Principles as a Special Type of Regulation 
 
Legal principles have been the subject matter of numerous publications in Polish literature. Yet, the 
issue has remained a matter of interest and controversy, as evidenced by works published in the 
period 2011-2014 [6], [8], [24]. Paradoxically, although it is indeed difficult to find a monograph 
which would not use the term legal principles, there is no consensus as to the substance of this 
notion.  
The term legal principle is not unambiguous in jurisp udence, and discussions on this matter 
are accompanied by conceptual confusion [28, p. 21]. It is pointed out that the term legal principle 
“is attributed not one, but several fundamentally different meanings, and yet attempts to arrive at a 
definition are made as if in each case it is just one, always the same, concept” [27, p. 59]. It is also 
noteworthy that various representatives of dogmatic dis iplines formulate differing catalogues of 
legal principles and attribute various characteristics o them. Speaking of such discrepancies, we 
can identify the following groups of issues: a) understanding of legal principles; b) criteria for 
segregation of legal principles; c) relation legal principle-legal text; d) validity of legal principles; e) 
characteristics of legal principles; f) functions of legal principles and ways of using them in the 
process of application of the law. 
Legal principles are mandatory legal norms characteised by certain features, which make it 
possible to segregate them and set them against thoe n rms within the system, which are not 
considered to be legal principles. We shall leave outside the scope of our analysis these 
characteristics which use the notion of legal principles to describe the way legal concepts are 
formed or to present the leading ideas within a legl system [25, pp. 28-52].   
In the Polish legal culture the term legal principle is traditionally reserved for norms which 
are of a fundamental (underlying for the system) character. They are distinguished by an 
exceptional axiological, functional and hierarchical significance [7, p. 81]. The proposed criteria for 
selecting legal principles are diverse. However, it is stressed that their character is different from 
that of other norms and that the role they play in the system is special. It is emphasised that legal 
principles express (formulate the obligation to realis ) values. For the most part, these are 
indeterminate norms, characterised by a high degree of g nerality. 
 In the literature written after the system transformation of 1989, authors have also referred 
to characteristics of legal principles proposed by Ronald Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Manuel Atienza 
and Juan R. Manero, and Humberto Ávila [1]. It is stre sed that it is necessary to accept the 
differentiation between principles and rules. Principles are norms that are used to a larger or smaller 
extent in accordance with the maxim more or less [4], [5]. There are different ways to classify legal 
principles. In particular, complex divisions of princ ples, whereby in addition to principles in the 
strict sense of the word policies are selected, are me ting with acceptance [2, pp. 6-11]. Another 
point raised is that the legal text is merely a starting point that is supposed to be used in a specific 
way in the process of application of the law [3, p. 2]. Whether a given norm will be considered a 
principle is determined by how it is used in the discourse. Principles, as opposed to rules, which 
determine the contents of the decision, make it possible to conduct the argumentative process that 
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leads to the issuance of the decision. They offer arguments for adopting a specific decision, or 
alternatively encompass merely part of the aspects tha  are important for the issuance thereof [3, pp. 
133-134].  
The very fact that views like the ones I have discus ed above exist makes it legitimate to 
conclude that there is indeed significant conceptual confusion surrounding legal principles. The fact 
that there are multiple views on this matter does not make the decision-making process easier. Since 
the various authors adopt different theoretical assumptions, their views are on many occasions 
incomprehensible for legal practitioners. Also, thesituation is not made any better by the fact that 
authors of theoretical works use different sets of to ls, which results in this complex matter being 
even more difficult to understand.  
 
3. Three Understandings of Legal Principles in Petrażycki’s Theory 
 
It should be accepted that the issue of legal principles is not an isolated notion from the other 
author’s theoretical and legal theses. Here first I think about Petrażycki’s essential concept which 
involves the description of law and its divisions (positive law – the intuitive law and the official one 
or the unofficial one) as well as the programme for the scientific policy of law.      
In my opinion, legal principles in Petrażycki’s perspective can be linked both with the 
postulates of law as well as with the legal norms applied. As far as the postulates of the system are 
concerned, the program of “the scientific policy of law” should be stressed. Following Lande’s 
writing, development of such policy has remained Petrażycki’s beloved idea. The subject of the 
legal policy is to establish findings referring to the future law. The policy of law as science aims to 
solve de lege ferenda principles in the scientific manner. Here an extremely interesting issue of the 
policy relation towards the natural law appears just in Petrażycki’s understanding. The author points 
clearly that a postulate to develop the policy of law would be a renewal for the dualistic division of 
jurisprudence, which was in the period so called the natural law. Petrażycki’s motto of “rebirth of 
natural law” (Wiedergeburt des Naturrechts) was presented and justified in the work entitled Die
Lehre vom Einkommen [14, p. 579]. As it was written in the study entitled O ideale społecznym i 
odrodzeniu prawa naturalnego (About social ideal and rebirth of natural law), the motto was 
understood in a sense of “developing the science for the policy of law based on the scientific and 
psychological research on casual ownership of law (…) [15, p. 28]. The author points exspressis 
verbis that the policy of law, among others, develops principles scientifically that should have been 
introduced into a system of law [19, p. 3]. The law legally binding should be based on these 
principles. They do not have the character of the norms in the law legally binding. At this point they 
are legal principles as the so-called postulates of the legal system for example the policy of the law
does not investigate what the law is like but what t e law should be like to as to fulfil the goals of 
the law and its aspiration for ideal.   
More difficult seems to be an analysis of the legal principles as the norm legally binding. 
Since legally binding law is not a notion on which Petrażycki focused on, he offered an introduction 
of construction for the official law instead. However, its description is extremely laconic. The 
official law is the applied law and supported by the representative governing authorities of the 
states. Taking into consideration the issues linked with the legislative principles, types of norms 
included in the official law achieve a special importance. I stress that content of the official law can 
be construed in various countries. The official lawcan include:  
a) various types of the positive law  
b) considerable amount of facts with the intuitive law in nature [12].     
Ad a) I would like to remind that the positive law includes a reference to the normative facts 
(experience of facts), which outline a specific conve tion of procedure, in its structure [18, p. 303]. 
This convention can be composed by the facts with various nature. The author lists the legislative 
law, customary law and the court practice as well as a legal doctrine and legal dicta (are the so-
called “varieties of the positive law”) [18, p. 320]. Here the attention should be paid to a very wide 
range of the positive law in Petrażycki’s perspective not compatible with a definition f the law 
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origin understood in the traditional manner [22]. Undoubtedly, the positive and legislative 
convention of procedures may be also established by the legal principles which play the integrating 
function in a discourse. It seems that in this perception of the legal principles they are the closest 
ones to the description most often accepted in Polish legislative culture.              
Ad b) Petrażycki, presenting the characteristic features of the official law, focuses especially 
on the phenomena being intuitive and legal in nature and involved in its composition. As the author 
writes, the official law includes not only various types of the positive law but the intuitive one as 
well [18, pp. 451-452]. Decisions of the intuitive law are adjusted in a free way to the specific and 
individual circumstances. It differentiates it from the positive law, which is hindered by the 
convention established in advance [18, pp. 250-251].    
Following the views in the analyses dedicated to the description of the intuitive law, which 
has been conducted in Polish theoretical and legislative rules, the concluding was justified that 
Petrażycki links the intuitive law with justice. Józef Nowacki points exspressis verbis that “justice 
identified by Petrażycki with the intuitive law becomes the key concept in the theory of law 
developed by him” [10, p. 79]. He focuses foremost on the role of the outside factors (upbringing, 
education, religion, etc.) that have an impact on the content of the intuitive law leading to the 
uniformity in the content of intuitional and legal beliefs [10, pp. 83-84].   
The intuitive law understood in this way (justice) constitutes a criterion for evaluation of 
positive law [18, p. 291]. Petrażycki indicates directly that various types of the positive law are 
subject to criticism from the point of view of justice (the intuitive law) as superior criterion [18, p. 
291]. It changes the positive law into the basic element of the official law.    
  The so-called axioms of the positive law possess the extraordinary meanings (among others 
justice, impartiality and good faith, etc.) [18, pp. 452-453]. These are the universal and consolidated 
beliefs of the intuitive law, according to which some principles and duties cannot be open to doubt 
[18, pp. 452-453].  
 Due to the presence of the suitable axioms of the intuitive law, nobody who is serious argues 
about that a human being has got the responsibility to refrain from killing other people or whether 
s/he has got the right on her/his side not to be kill d by the others, etc. [18, pp. 452-453]. I would 
like to stress that axioms of the intuitive law, on condition that they are related to the matters from 
the sphere of the official law, are accepted both by the courts and other governing authorities. It 
seems that a following view can be presented: under the pre-arranged Petrażycki’s term of “axioms 
of the intuitive law” hides a set of universally accepted (introduced) values (under the form of 
principles), which are supported institutionally. They are so obvious that nobody strives for the 
introduction of positive and legal conventions (norms of the positive law) in this subject.           
 I think that Petrażycki’s description for the axioms of the positive law is very close to 
Dworkinowski’s perspective of legal principles. Since they are legally binding due to its authority 
which leads to the universal acceptance by the state governing authorities and judiciary. 
Consequently, they are the criteria for the evaluation of the positive law, leading to the fair decision 
(the only and correct one) in the individual case investigate by the state governing authorities 
particularly courts. Following the analysis mentioned above, a question must appear: is the 
description of the official law in Petrażycki’s definition possible to maintain viewing the 
assumptions of psychological theory. Various interpr tations of this issue are expressed in writings. 
Detailed analyses of this matter were presented in ifferent stadium of mine [23]. They led to a 
conclusion that Petrażycki, defining the official law, transfers his reflctions on law unconsciously 
from the sphere of psychical experience into the sphere of real and social practice. Norms at that 
point remaining in the individual psyche must exist socially in some way [20, pp. 289-290]. Here as 
a matter of fact a concept of the official law is getting close to the views, which are linking the 
notion of law with development of specific conventio .  A definition of law described within the 
category of social fact can be found in many current concepts both in Polish and international 
literature.     
 A different issue is whether it is possible to develop a legally binding concept of law 
omitting real social practice. It can be stated carefully that even Petrażycki, who had attempted to 
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bring completely the legal phenomena to its psychological surface, was not successful in developing 
a concept of legally binding law. The law which assumed that it will be completely transferred into 
field of psychological experience [24, pp. 346-355]. Consequently, his reflections devoted to the 
official law focus in fact on functions of governing authority of states.      
     
4. Conclusion 
 
Aleksander Peczenik paid attention to Petrażycki’s research results which modern theory of law has
been filled deeply with [13, p. 13]. I have no doubts that this statement can be referred to the issue 
of legal principles. We can find a division into legal principles as norms of binding law and its 
postulates (in the form of the scientific policy of law) in Petrażycki’s statements. Still, the most 
inspiring part of the author’s concept related to legal principles is the notion for the composition of 
the official law. It seems that Petrażycki has been a precursor of the view that the legally binding 
law (in the form of the official law) can be perceiv d narrowly. Consequently, it involves norms of 
various nature. If we add to it that axioms of the intuitive law are surprisingly like Dworkinow’s 
legal principles, the composition of the official lw (including both positive-legal norms as well as 
intuitive-legal norms) becomes extremely close to the concepts differentiating rules and principles. 
Certainly, Petrażycki tries to remain loyal to his assumptions of his theory, transferring the official 
law in the sphere of psychical experience. However, the opportunity to defend psychological 
criterium for the definition of official law is terribly dubious. Concerning this support, is this legally 
binding and accepted by the representatives of the governing state authorities different than the 
institutional support, which was described by Dworkin analysing the legal principles. 
Simultaneously, his theory evolves in this place towards the concept of social facts. In the last 
words of my presentation I underline that the reflections here described are only the interpretation 
of Petrażycki’s statements. It is because of his definitions with the designing nature, the analyses 
based on his theory of many views, which are traditionally implemented by jurisprudence, are the 
subjective interpretation of the author’s words. It is just like they are understood by a researcher 
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